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Recently, interoception and homeostasis have been described in terms of
predictive coding and active inference. Afferent signals update prior predic-
tions about the state of the body, and stimulate the autonomic mediation of
homeostasis. Performance on tests of interoceptive accuracy (IAc) may indi-
cate an individual’s ability to assign precision to interoceptive signals, thus
determining the relative influence of ascending signals and the descending
prior predictions. Accordingly, individuals with high IAc should be better
able to regulate during the postprandial period. One hundred females
were allocated to consume glucose, an artificially sweetened drink, water
or no drink. Before, and 30 min after a drink, IAc, heart rate (HR) and
blood glucose (BG) were measured, and participants rated their hunger,
thirst and mood. A higher IAc was related to lower BG levels, a decline in
anxiety and a higher HR, after consuming glucose. A higher IAc also
resulted in a larger decline in hunger if they consumed either glucose or
sucralose. These data support the role of active inference in interoception
and homeostasis, and suggest that the ability to attend to interoceptive signals
may be critical to the maintenance of physical and emotional health.
1. Introduction
Interoception, the perception and interpretation of visceral afferent signals,
underpins homeostatic functioning [1], and is an essential component in
many theories of emotion [1–6]. However, interoception is no longer viewed
as a ‘stimulus–response’ system, and several recent models have linked intero-
ception and homeostatic/allostatic control to predictive coding and active
inference [2,7–9].
According to these models, afferent visceral signals (i.e. interoceptive
prediction errors (IPE)) update posterior predictions based upon prior beliefs
(i.e. previously learned/innate expectations) about the state of the body. Des-
cending predictions are then considered to nuance homeostatic set points that
mediate physiological homoeostasis through autonomic reflexes [10]. In other
words, top-down predictions are compared with experienced interoceptive
states—a ‘mismatch’ results in IPE (i.e. that part of incoming interoceptive sen-
sation not accounted for by prior expectations)—the goal is to minimize IPE [9].
Within the interoceptive system, prediction error (PE) minimization is
realized, either by revising top-down predictions or by modifying the sensory
signals so that they comply with the predictions (active inference) [10]. The
nature of PE minimization is determined by the relative precision of ascending
prediction error signals, and descending prior beliefs. Precision is the inverse
variance associated with each probability distribution, thus is an index of
reliability [11]. When sensory precision is high, inference is driven by sensory
evidence, whereas when prior beliefs have greater precision, their influence
& 2019 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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dominates [10]. Both within and between sensory modalities,
precision is continually modified. One way to optimize
sensory precision is through attention [12]. For example, the
ability of some individuals to perform well on tests of inter-
oceptive accuracy (e.g. heartbeat tracking) may be due to
their capacity to amplify the precision of interoceptive signals
by attending to them [13].
Crucially, PE minimization is repeated throughout levels of
the cortical hierarchy—messages are passed recurrently between
levels [10]. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, homeostasis is
maintained through the suppression of IPE by autonomic
reflexes [10]. However, predictions at deeper levels embody
increasingly expansive, multimodal representations of the
present (and counterfactual future) interoceptive state [14].
This provides the basis for more complex forms of homeostatic
regulation through the suppression of sensorimotor PE [10].
Although these frameworks have received theoretical
support, to date they lack empirical verification. Nonetheless,
they permit a number of testable hypotheses. Specifically,
individuals who are more sensitive to interoceptive signals
may (i) more readily engage innate autonomic reflexes in
response to surprising interoceptive states (e.g. the difference
between the expected level of glucose and the currently
sensed level), and (ii) be more proficient at learning the
parameters of the models that predict interoceptive state tran-
sitions. In other words, those with high interoceptive abilities
may have stronger causal mappings between ascending pre-
diction errors experienced in one sensory modality (e.g.
tasting a sweet drink), and associated descending interocep-
tive predictions (e.g. an anticipated increase in blood
glucose (BG)/gastric distension). Both mechanisms should
afford those with more precise signals superior homeostatic
control. Thus the primary objective of the present study was
to explore the link between interoceptive accuracy (IAc) (an
index of the ability to assign precision to interoceptive signals
[13]), and the postprandial response to a glucose load.
Importantly, variability in the response to glucose
consumption is well documented [15]. Moderating factors
that have been identified include glucose intolerance
[16,17], body mass index (BMI) [18], and subjective [19] and
objective sensitivity to hypoglycaemia [17,20]. Although
speculative, it is plausible that differences in IPE precision
may mediate the influence of these factors.
In support of this suggestion individuals with lower
vagal tone, measured using heart rate variability (HRV),
had a greater glycaemic and appetitive response to glucose
[21]. Similar effects have been reported after consuming
water; an increase in HRV was related to a better mood
[22]. Notably, heart rate (HR) and HRV are inversely related
to interoceptive accuracy [23]. Those with higher HRV may
be better able to maintain homeostasis during the postpran-
dial period due to increased interoceptive processing (i.e.
by affording more precision to ascending IPEs).
Importantly, IPEs awarded high precision are said to have
privileged access to higher (possibly conscious) levels of the
cortical hierarchy [24]. This potentially explains variability
in the ability to consciously identify changes in glycaemia
[25], a difference that has been related to the degree to
which individuals experience associated subjective symp-
toms (e.g. hunger/mood) [26]. These data imply that
although reducible IPEs at the lowest hierarchical levels
(e.g. those involved in the control of BG) usually operate
unconsciously, their precision may vary such that some
individuals consciously experience a change in affect. Inter-
estingly, it is proposed that irreducible IPEs underlie certain
emotional states, especially anxiety [5]. Therefore, differences
in IPE precision may relate to the subjective change in affect/
hunger following a glucose load. A secondary aim of the
present study was to test this hypothesis.
Together there is strong theoretical support for the
hypothesis that differences in interoceptive accuracy should
relate to the glycaemic, autonomic and subjective response
to glucose. It was predicted that those with high IAc would
have better homeostatic regulation. With this in mind, the
present study examined the response to glucose, an artifi-
cially sweetened drink, water or no drink. The design
allowed us to infer the relative contribution of PE at different
levels: humeral (a change in BG), gustatory (a sweet taste)
and gastric (volume of liquid consumed) signals.
2. Methods
(a) Participants
The sample size was based on the expected power for a hypoth-
esized within–between interaction. Total sample size was
calculated using G*POWER based on the following parameters:
eight between-subject groups (four drink conditions, two IAc
groups) and two within-subject levels (baseline/after taking a
drink) with an expected correlation of 0.6, giving an estimated
n of 80. With a ¼ 0.05, and a two-tailed test, there was 96%
power to detect a medium-sized effect (Cohen’s f2 ¼ 0.250). To
be confident, 100 females between 18 and 33 years were recruited
(table 1). Exclusion criteria included any metabolic or cardiovas-
cular disorder, gastrointestinal problems, pregnancy and a
diagnosis of a mood or eating disorder. BMI ranged from 17.6
to 39.7 kg m22; 6.0% were underweight (BMI , 18.5), 64.0%
of the sample had a normal BMI between 18.5 and 24.9, 22.0%
of the sample were overweight with a BMI between 25 and 30,
and the remaining 8.0% of the sample were obese with a
BMI . 30. Participants refrained from drinking alcohol and
physical activity within 24 h of the study, and from consuming
any food and drink for at least 8 h before attending the labora-
tory. Testing commenced between 09.00 and 13.00.
(b) Procedure
After providing their written informed consent, participants
rated their mood, hunger and thirst. Participants had their
height, weight and fasting BG measured, and conventional
Ag/AgCl electrodes and transducers were applied and
connected to a BIOPAC MP150 and ECG100C amplifier
module (BIOPAC, USA). Participants then completed the intero-
ception task as outlined below. Interbeat interval data were
monitored throughout the interoception task with a sampling
rate of 2000 Hz. The participants were then randomly allocated
to receive water, sucralose, glucose or nothing. The random
sequence was computer generated by H.A.Y. who produced
the solutions in sequentially numbered tumblers. Participants
were allocated by C.M.G. in the order they were recruited. The
subjects were blind as to the nature of the drinks consumed.
With the exception of hunger ( p , 0.014), at baseline the
groups were well matched for subjective ratings, interoception,
fasting BG and BMI (table 1). Participants were given 5 min to
consume the beverage, following which they relaxed (reading
of watching TV) for 30 min, before they again rated their
mood, hunger and thirst, completed the heartbeat perception
task, and a BG measurement was taken. HR was recorded for a
second time. Finally, after 60 min another BG measurement
was taken.
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(c) Test drinks
Each drink was 500ml provided in a clear plastic tumbler. The
glucose drink contained 75 g of glucose dissolved in water. The
sugar-free beverage was sweetened with sucralose to produce a
similar sweetness to the other drink, which was confirmed
during previous experiments [21]. These two drinks contained
10ml of lemon juice to increase palatability. An equal volume
of plain water was consumed in the water condition. Participants
who consumed nothing were unaware that other participants
had consumed a drink.
(d) Interoceptive accuracy
The heartbeat perception task was performed using the
mental tracking method [27] with intervals of 30, 35, 40, 45
and 50 s that were separated by 30 s resting periods. During
each trial R-R intervals were recorded and participants were
asked to silently count their heartbeats without the use of
an exteroceptive aid (such as taking one’s pulse). At the end
of each period participants reported the number of counted
heartbeats. The participants were not informed about the
length of the counting phases nor about the quality of their
performance. The transformation 1 2
P
(abs(actual 2
reported))/(actual) was used to calculate heartbeat tracking
scores. These scores were then averaged to form a mean heart-
beat tracking score (IAc). The interoception score varied
between 0 and 1 with a higher score indicating better accu-
racy. The internal consistency of this measure was excellent:
Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.96. This heartbeat tracking task is a stan-
dard measure used to assess the accuracy of the ability to
detect interoceptive signals and was chosen as it may specifi-
cally measure an individual’s ability to selectively attend to
interoceptive signals [13].
(e) Blood glucose
BG was monitored from finger pricks using an ExacTech sensor
(Medisense Britain Limited) with an enzymic method, coupled
with microelectronic measurement, which has been shown to
be accurate [28].
( f ) Mood, hunger and thirst
Participants were asked to describe the way they felt ‘at that
moment’ using visual analogue scales (VAS) with pairs of adjec-
tives at the ends of 100 mm lines: composed/anxious, elated/
depressed, tired/energetic, not at all hungry/extremely hungry
and not at all thirsty/extremely thirsty [29].
(g) Body mass index
Body mass was measured using an electronic scale (Kern
KMS-TM, Kenr and Sohn GmbH, Germany) that took 50 assess-
ments over a 5 s period and produced an average value. Height
was measured using a portable stadiometer.
(h) Control of the proportion of type 1 errors
The present study examined effects on seven dependant
variables therefore the potential of detecting false positives was
controlled using Benjamini and Hochberg’s false discovery
rate (FDR). The FDR was controlled at d ¼ 0.05. (electronic sup-
plementary material, table S1). Where significant interactions did
not reach this threshold this is indicated in the text. Confidence
intervals for simple effects were adjusted using the Bonferroni
correction.Ta
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3. Results
(a) Descriptive results
A one-sample t-test confirmed that the overall score for IAc
was above chance level (mean ¼ 0.64, s.d. ¼ 0.19), t ¼ 33.06,
p, 0.001). Those who scored above this level were con-
sidered to have high IAc, whereas those below were
considered to have low IAc.
(b) The effect of interoceptive accuracy on changes in
blood glucose
Initially it was considered whether the effect on BG of con-
suming glucose, rather than sucralose, water or nothing,
varied according to individual differences in IAc. A 4
(drink: glucose, sucralose, water, nothing)  2 (IAc: high,
low)  3 (time: fasting BG, 30 min BG, 60 min BG)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. BMI and age
were considered covariants. Neither age (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 0.034,
p ¼ 0.855, h2p ¼ 0:001) nor BMI (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 3.523, p ¼
0.064, h2p ¼ 0:038) contributed significantly to the model.
As expected the interaction time  drink was significant
(F ¼ (6,180) ¼ 38.705, p, 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:563): participants
who consumed glucose had significantly higher BG levels
after both 30 and 60 min compared to all other drinks (all
p, 0.001). The interaction time  drink  IAc also reached
significance (F ¼ (6,180) ¼ 2.832, p, 0.012, h2p ¼ 0:086).
In those who consumed sucralose, water or nothing, BG
did not differ at any time point depending on IAc (all p.
0.285). Similarly, IAc did not influence fasting BG across the
entire sample ( p ¼ 0.841) or in the group who drank glucose
( p ¼ 0.386). However, after 30 min those with low IAc had
higher BG levels if they consumed glucose (figure 1) ( p ,
0.013). The effect was similar after 60 min ( p , 0.001).
These findings suggest that individuals with higher IAc
may be better able to regulate their glycaemic response
to glucose.
(c) The effect of interoceptive accuracy and glucose
on heart rate
Next it was considered whether consuming glucose, rather
than sucralose, water or nothing, influenced HR and whether
this varied according to individual differences in IAc. A 4
(drink: glucose, sucralose, water, nothing)  2 (IAc: high,
low)  2 (time: fasting HR, 30 min HR) repeated-measures
ANOVA was conducted. BMI and age were considered
covariants. Neither BMI (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 0.070, p ¼ 0.792,
h2p ¼ 0:001) nor age (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 0.443, p ¼ 0.508,
h2p ¼ 0:005) were related to HR. There was a significant
time  drink interaction (F ¼ (3, 90) ¼ 13.206, p, 0.001,
h2p ¼ 0:306), reflecting a decline in HR, from T1 to T2, in
those who consumed sucralose ( p, 0.001), water ( p,
0.001) or nothing ( p, 0.001); the effect was absent in those
who drank glucose ( p ¼ 0.448). There was also a significant
time  drink  IAc interaction (F3,90 ¼ 2.989, p, 0.035,
h2p ¼ 0:091). IAc did not influence the autonomic response
to consuming sucralose, water or nothing (figure 2).
However, in those who drank glucose, a higher IAc was
associated with an increase in HR after the drink ( p,
0.033). Conversely, this effect was absent in those with low
IAc ( p ¼ 0.288).
(d) The effect of interoceptive accuracy and glucose
on mood
From the interoceptive inference perspective, emotions are
motivating signals that arise as a result of a discrepancy
between expected and actual body states (interoceptive pre-
diction error). If correct then IAc should relate to the
affective response to glucose (a homeostatic challenge that
produces PE). Initially effects on ratings of anxiety (ANX)
were considered. A 4 (drink: glucose, sucralose, water,
nothing)  2 (IAc: high, low)  2 (time: fasting anxiety,
30 min anxiety) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted.
BMI and age were considered covariants. Neither BMI (F ¼
(1, 90) ¼ 1.552, p ¼ 0.216, h2p ¼ 0:017) nor age (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼
2.203, p ¼ 0.141, h2p ¼ 0:024) were related to ANX. However,
the Time  Drink  IAc interaction was significant (F ¼
(3, 90) ¼ 6.431, p, 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:177). In those who con-
sumed glucose, those with high IAc experienced a decline
in ANX ( p, 0.001). Interestingly, this effect was reversed
in those with low IAc who experienced an increase in anxiety
after consuming glucose ( p, 0.006). IAc did not influence
anxiety in any of the other groups (all p. 0.169) (figure 3).
Assuming those high in IAc are better able to minimize PE,
this may explain their reduction in anxiety.
The analysis was repeated for ratings of depression (DEP).
Older participants were more depressed (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 5.670,
p, 0.019, h2p ¼ 0:059). The effect of BMI was also significant
(F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 4.193, p, 0.044, h2p ¼ 0:044). However, none of
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the interactions involving drink or IAc reached significance:
time  drink (F ¼ (3, 90) ¼ 0.036, p ¼ 0.991, h2p ¼ 0:001) and
time  drink  IAc (F ¼ (3, 90) ¼ 1.063, p ¼ 0.369,
h2p ¼ 0:034).
Similarly, when tiredness was considered, only age reached
significance (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 8.007, p, 0.006, h2p ¼ 0:082); older
participants were more tired. BMI did not relate to energy
levels (F ¼ (1, 90) ¼ 0.847, p, 0.360, h2p ¼ 0:009), and neither
were any of the interactions involving drink or IAc: time 
drink (F ¼ (3, 90) ¼ 1.404, p ¼ 0.247, h2p ¼ 0:045) and time 
drink  IAc (F ¼ (3, 90) ¼ 0.484, p ¼ 0.694, h2p ¼ 0:016).
(e) The effect of interoceptive accuracy and glucose on
hunger and thirst
In the context of interoception, hunger and thirst are arguably
the most motivationally relevant subjective feelings. A 4
(drink: glucose, sucralose, water, nothing)  2 (IAc: high,
low)  2 (time: fasting anxiety, 30 min anxiety) repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted. BMI and age were
considered covariants. Age contributed significantly (F ¼
(1, 90) ¼ 4.093, p, 0.046, h2p ¼ 0:044), but BMI did not (F ¼
(1, 90) ¼ 3.589, p, 0.061, h2p ¼ 0:038).
The drink  time interaction was significant (F ¼ (3,
90) ¼ 3.156, p, 0.029, h2p ¼ 0:095); those who drank glucose
( p, 0.031) experienced a significant decline in hunger. In
addition, the time  drink  IAc interaction was also signifi-
cant (F ¼ (3, 90) ¼ 3.381, p, 0.022, h2p ¼ 0:101); however, as
the FDR threshold for this interaction was p, 0.021 this
effect should be interpreted with caution (electronic
supplementary material, table S1). Nonetheless, those with
high, but not low, IAc had a decline in hunger after glucose
( p, 0.003) and sucralose ( p, 0.001) ( p ¼ 0.921 and p ¼
0.163 respectively in those with low IAc). In addition, those
with high, but not low, IAc had an increase in hunger after
nothing ( p, 0.044) ( p ¼ 0.512 in those with low IAc). No
effects were observed in those who consumed water (high
IAc p ¼ 0.252, low IAc p ¼ 0.598) (figure 4).
Similar effects were seen when thirst was considered.
Neither the effect of BMI nor the effect of age was significant.
However, the time  drink interaction was significant
(F3,90¼ 4.387, p, 0.006, h2p ¼ 0:128). After a drink, those who
consumed water were less thirsty than those who consumed
nothing (p, 0.007). The time  drink  IAc interaction was
significant (F ¼ (3, 90) ¼ 3.333, p, 0.023, h2p ¼ 0:100). Partici-
pants who consumed nothing were thirstier than those who
consumed glucose (p, 0.035), sucralose (p, 0.026) and
water (p, 0.002), but only if they had high IAc (p ¼ 0.613,
p ¼ 0.821, p ¼ 0.158 respectively in those with low IAc).
( f ) The effect of changes in BG on changes in
interoceptive accuracy
Hitherto, we have examined differential responses in people
with high and low baseline interoceptive accuracy. However,
an important aspect of interoceptive inference is the circular
causality between states of the body and inferred bodily
states. One aspect of this is that BG, in and of itself, may
change IAc. Partial correlation analysis (controlling for age
and BMI) revealed an interesting pattern of results (table 2).
Sixty minutes after glucose consumption those with higher
IAc had lower BG levels (r ¼ 20.379, p, 0.047). A positive
correlation was observed between an increase in BG after
30 min and a change in IAc but this effect did not reach sig-
nificance (r ¼ 0.344, p, 0.073). Conversely, in both the water
(r ¼ 20.569, p, 0.013 after 60 min) and nothing conditions
(r ¼ 20.572, p, 0.013 after 30 min, r ¼ 20.523, p, 0.026
after 60 min) negative correlations between changes in BG
and changes in IAc were observed. Interestingly, despite a
similar decline in BG levels no correlations were observed
in those who consumed sucralose.
4. Discussion
The objective of the present study was to empirically test
predictions from the active inference framework within the
interoceptive domain. Key findings were that after consum-
ing glucose individuals with high interoceptive accuracy
(IAc) had lower BG levels, a decline in anxiety (but not
depression or fatigue), and greater autonomic nervous
system (ANS) reactivity. Those with high IAc also had a
high IAclow IAc
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Figure 3. Change in anxiety from before to after consuming either glucose,
sucralose, water or nothing in those with high or low IAc. n ¼ 100. In those
who consumed glucose, those with high IAc experienced a decline in ANX
( p , 0.001). This effect was reversed in those with low IAc who experienced
an increase in anxiety after consuming glucose ( p , 0.006). (Online version
in colour.)
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Figure 4. Change in hunger from before to after consuming either glucose,
sucralose, water or nothing in those with high or low IAc. n ¼ 100. Those
with high, but not low, IAc had a decline in hunger after glucose ( p ,
0.003) and sucralose ( p , 0.001) ( p ¼ 0.921 and p ¼ 0.163 respectively
in those with low IAc). In addition, those with high, but not low, IAc had
an increase in hunger after nothing ( p, 0.044) ( p ¼ 0.512 in those
with low IAc). No effects were observed in those who consumed water
(high IAc p ¼ 0.252, low IAc p ¼ 0.598). (Online version in colour.)
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decline in hunger after consuming either glucose or sucralose.
Taking IAc as an index of the capacity to use attention to
prioritize interoceptive signals [13], these findings suggest
that high sensory precision may facilitate homeostatic and
affective regulation during the post-prandial period.
This is the first report that those with higher IAc have a
greater autonomic responsiveness to a glucose challenge
(figure 2). However, a number of studies have reported
greater autonomic reactivity in individuals with high IAc
more generally. For example, those high in IAc experienced
stronger HR responses to a range of emotionally pleasant
and unpleasant stimuli [30,31]. In addition, differences in
IAc may account for variation in responses to other homeo-
static challenges. Herbert et al. [32] considered whether IAc
modified the self-regulatory response to a physical load
(self-paced cycling). Interestingly, good heartbeat perceivers
showed a smaller increase in HR, stroke volume and cardiac
output. However, they also covered a significantly shorter
distance, an effect that correlated positively with the auto-
nomic changes [32]. This suggests that the reduced
autonomic response in good heartbeat perceivers might be
explained by less physical effort—a high sensory precision
may have facilitated behavioural self-control of workload
through the propagation of IPEs to higher levels of the hier-
archy. Future research where participants are not afforded
the opportunity to self-pace is required to determine whether
comparable increases in autonomic activity to those in the
present study are observed.
A consideration is that the present study measured auto-
nomic reactivity within the cardiac domain, and it remains to
be tested whether similar effects would be observed in other
domains (e.g. vagal efferent innervation of the pancreas).
Nonetheless, compensatory cardiovascular changes follow-
ing a glucose load are necessary to prevent a postprandial
fall in blood pressure [33]. Therefore, communication
between the cardiovascular and glucoregulatory systems is
a physiological requirement, and changes in autonomic func-
tioning within the cardiac domain represent an important
component of the homeostatic response.
An important finding of the present study was that indi-
viduals with lower IAc had higher BG levels (figure 1),
suggesting that such individuals have poorer homeostatic
regulation. The first possible explanation for this finding is
that a high sensory precision makes good heartbeat percei-
vers more sensitive to ascending IPEs (e.g. an unexpected
change in BG). This could facilitate homeostasis through the
engagement of reflexes at low levels of the cortical hierarchy
(e.g. vagally mediated secretion of insulin [34]). Indeed it has
been argued that impaired glucose homeostasis may be
caused by initial defects in glucose sensing [35].
However, a critical question concerns the connection
between conscious heartbeat perception accuracy, with
neural correlates in the insula and prefrontal cortex [36],
and unconscious homeostatic control, occurring mainly in
the brainstem and the hypothalamus [35]. Individuals at
rest are not usually aware of their heartbeat—heartbeat track-
ing tasks ‘require’ individuals to direct their attention
consciously towards this interoceptive modality. Given that
homeostatic control proceeds without the need for conscious
attention it is interesting that the two should be related.
From a behavioural perspective, recent frameworks have
differentiated between different interoceptive dimensions.
Originally, Garfinkel et al. [37] argued that (i) interoceptiveTa
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accuracy (objective performance), (ii) interoceptive metacog-
nitive awareness (confidence–accuracy correspondence) and
(iii) interoceptive sensibility (self-evaluation) should be con-
sidered independently. This has been extended to include
(iv) afferent signal (e.g. baroreceptor activity/heart evoked
potential), (v) preconscious impact of interoceptive signals
on conscious processing (e.g. presenting stimuli at different
parts of the electrocardiogram) and (vi) executive (switching
between modalities) [38].
Using such frameworks comparable paradigms can be
developed to assess interoceptive abilities across domains.
For example, IAc (heartbeat tracking) might be akin to the
accuracy of estimated BG levels [25], a change in BG might
be analogous to changes in the firing rate of action potentials
from the baroreceptors [39], while the subjective response to a
change in BG (figure 3) may align to the preconscious impact
of cardiovascular signals on the subjective interpretation of
stimuli [40].
However, it remains uncertain to what degree interocep-
tive dimensions at different levels interact. For example,
conscious attention to the heartbeat increased the amplitude
of the heart evoked potential [41]; a measure thought to
reflect the strength of the afferent signal [38], and positively
related to performance on the heartbeat tracking task [42].
Within the glucoregulatory domain, variability in BG esti-
mation accuracy was related to the degree to which
individuals subjectively perceived a change in mood [26].
Furthermore, providing conscious information about BG
levels improved the ability to accurately estimate current
BG levels [43]. In addition, the cephalic phase response
aptly demonstrates circular causality between expected
bodily states, and the current state of the body [44]. These
interoceptive beliefs may operate at conscious or unconscious
levels [45], alter homeostatic states [44], and are in turn
learned from previous interoceptive sensations [46]. Within
the cardiac domain, the influence of preconscious barorecep-
tor signalling on memory was modulated by participant’s
conscious performance on a heartbeat perception test [47].
Additionally, self-reported confidence correlated with heart-
beat perception, but only in those with high IAc [37].
Together, these findings suggest that within domains
interoceptive dimensions occurring at different degrees of
consciousness are somewhat interdependent. Such data
might explain the present observation that a measure of
conscious interoceptive accuracy (IAc) was related to the
unconscious homeostatic (figure 1) and conscious subjective
(figures 3 and 4) responses to glucose.
Few studies have assessed interoception across domains
simultaneously; generally moderate relationships across
axes are reported. For example, Herbert et al. [48] found an
inverse relationship between IAc and the amount of water a
person could consume until reaching the point of individu-
ally perceived fullness. Conversely, Garfinkel et al. [49]
recently found no association between cardiac and respirat-
ory measures of IAc (i.e. task performance). However,
interoceptive metacognitive awareness generalized across
these domains.
Interestingly, there is also anatomical and neuroima-
ging evidence that the brain tracks or integrates different
interoceptive signals in similar regions including insula,
somatosensory cortices, cingulate, amygdala, thalamus
and brainstem [9,50]. For example, peripheral BG levels
have been linked to changes in insula activity [51,52], an
area of the brain often associated with heartbeat perception
[53], and thought to play a role in registering IPE [54].
Together with the present findings these data suggest
that there may be a general interoceptive sensitivity
across cardiovascular and glucoregulatory domains.
Specifically, not only did fasting IAc relate to subsequent
changes in BG, but after consuming water or not drinking
a decline in BG was associated with an increase in IAc
(table 2). Taken in the context of the present literature
suggesting that interoceptive processes associate across
and within modalities, these findings lend support to a
key aspect of predictive coding—that precision represents
a ‘common currency’ across perceptual domains, at every
level of the hierarchy [10].
A second interpretation of the present findings is that
the gustatory properties (e.g. sweet taste) of the drink
could have induced beliefs about interoceptive changes
(e.g. an anticipated increase in BG). This may have contrib-
uted to a cephalic phase response that facilitated
homeostatic control. Prior beliefs may be innate or learned,
therefore high IAc may facilitate the acquisition of genera-
tive models driving cephalic responses. That those with
high IAc had a decline in hunger after both glucose and
sucralose is consistent with this interpretation (figure 4).
Indeed there is evidence that gustatory and cardiovascular
information is integrated within the insula [55]. However,
there is controversy over whether the sensation of sweetness
alone is an effective stimulus for the cephalic phase
response [56], with no effects observed after modified
sham feeding with sucralose [57], leading to claims that
there are responders and non-responders [58]. The present
findings suggest that individual differences in the ability
to prioritize interoceptive signals may be an important
moderator of the cephalic response; an important avenue
for future research.
A final observation was that those with higher IAc
reported a decline in anxiety if they consumed glucose; the
opposite pattern was observed in those with lower IAc
(figure 3). Recent proposals argue that a negative emotional
valence results from irreducible free energy (the sum total
of PEs), whereas a reduction in free energy produces positive
affect [59]. Emotional arousal is hypothesized to depend on
interoceptive precision [13]. Indeed, individuals high in
anxiety tend to perform better on heartbeat perception
tasks [5,60,61]. The present observation that after consuming
glucose those high in IAc reported a decline in anxiety may
be explained by their ability to effectively minimize PEs.
This is supported by their greater autonomic reactivity and
better glycaemic regulation (figures 1 and 2). An increase in
anxiety in those with lower IAc could be due to an increase
in irreducible free energy. Future research should consider
the dimensional nature of affect, for example by dissociating
changes in valence and arousal.
Although IAc was related to changes in anxiety, no
effects were observed when depression or tiredness was
considered. Interestingly, fatigue and depression may
result from a chronic inability to maintain homeostasis
[14], whereby individuals become ‘locked in’ to an energy-
inefficient internal model [62]. Accordingly, this may
result from poorly calibrated precision estimates due to
aberrant hyperpriors (prior expectations about precision),
and consequently an insensitivity to IPEs. On the other
hand, due to a loss of prior precision, those with anxiety
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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may remain responsive to peripheral feedback [63]. This
might explain why ratings of depression and tiredness
were not altered by the nature of the drink. As mood is
thought to represent a hyperprior over precision, future
research might investigate how underlying interoceptive
computations present biologically in response to other
homeostatic challenges.
The limitations of the present study should be considered.
First, the validity of the heartbeat counting task has been
questioned due to the possibility that participants may base
their counts on beliefs about HR [64]. Therefore, future
research should seek to replicate these findings using a
more robust heartbeat discrimination task based on the
method of constant stimuli [23]. In addition, it has previously
been considered that only those above 0.85 on this heartbeat
counting test be considered to have high IAc [65]. This study
should be replicated using a preselected sample of partici-
pants scoring 0.85 or higher. The design of the study meant
that participants attended the laboratory having fasted for
8 h, and in some cases received no drink. This meant that par-
ticipants were fasted for different lengths of time. As food
deprivation has been shown to influence interoceptive aware-
ness [66] this may not have been an entirely neutral control
condition. Ratings of hunger were correlated with IAc at
baseline (table 1), so it is possible that absolute ratings of
hunger may have influenced the results—those who arrived
hungrier may have had higher IAc, and subsequently a
larger decline in hunger. However, selecting participants
within the glucose condition so that they were matched on
hunger at baseline did not alter the pattern of results (base-
line: high IAc 62.5(4.8), low IAc 63.4(4.8); after: high IAc
54.8(6.5), low IAc 40.5(6.5)). A factor that could limit the gen-
eralizability of the results of this study is that, while 100
participants were recruited, the possibility exists that the
study was underpowered to detect between-subject effects.
In addition, the sample comprised only young college
students and future research may consider different popu-
lations who may have more difficulties with regulation of
their BG levels.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the present study provides empirical data in
support of the role of interoceptive inference in the control
of homeostasis. The finding that after a glucose load a
better interoceptive accuracy (IAc) was related to lower BG
levels, a decline in rating of anxiety and larger modifications
of ANS functioning is consistent with the view that those
with higher IAc are better able to assign precision to intero-
ceptive signals [13]. It is plausible that such individuals are
able to increase precision in interoceptive systems more gen-
erally, lending support to the contention that there is a
general sensitivity for interoceptive processes across modal-
ities. Recent conceptualizations of ‘health’ emphasize
resilience and the capacity to adapt to daily challenges [67],
including homeostatic challenges [68]. The present data indi-
cate that the ability to attend to interoceptive signals may be
critical to this process. It has been argued that differences in
interoception drive symptom inter-correlation across psychia-
tric conditions, and thus give rise to the hypothetical ‘p
factor’ [69]. Given that the maintenance of homeostasis is con-
sidered a core function of interoceptive inference, it is
recommended that such proposals be extended to also
encompass physical health.
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